Molly is over-simplifying again. Does she count Kuwait as one of the 15 failed actions to produce democracy? That would be unfair as it wasn't the goal. My BS sense just twitched.

Her piece wanders a bit. Reporting has no influence or indeed anything to do with how the endgame is handled.

"If you want peace in the Middle East, you lean mightily on both Israel and Palestine: settlers off the West Bank, two-state solution, GO. Then why not a Marshall Plan for the Middle East?"

Well, Bush already said the first part (and I think she's overstating that as a reason to go to war), he just wants Arafat out of the way first. The thing with the Marshall plan, is that it happened _after_ the crazed dictators were removed. I doubt the Marshall plan would have worked if Hitler and Mussolini were still in power.

We've already begun with the Marshall plan in Afghanistan. One of the problems is while the US has ponied up what we promised, the rest of the world hasn't.

Can someone name me 5 unilateral US military actions (that led to regime change) in the last 100 years? This is going to drive me nuts all day.

She doesn't say there were fifteen failed attempts to produce democracy. She says there were twenty forced regime changes, and only five of them produced democracy. I think part of the point of the article is the fact that the US often intervenes to install undemocratic regimes.

As for the five unilateral actions, I'm not sure exactly which sthe's talking about, but if I was going to look for them, I'd start in Latin America. In the first half of the century we were in and out of Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras and Nicaragua more times than I can count.

Here's a list of US military actions, 1775-present. Feel free to start arguing about which are what. :)

Scott --- the offer of inclusion in the Marshall Plan was formally extended to areas under the control of regimes planted there by the Soviets, and to the Soviets themselves; and Marshall Plan aid was given to the Greeks, who had a dictator at the time, and the Turks, who were still run by their army.

I don't think *anybody* has been dumb enough to propose that trying to establish democracy in Iraq is going to be a cakewalk.

But can you honestly say that even a half-baked, fledgling democratic attempt could possibly be *worse* than Saddam's brutal police state?

Of course not. What I resent is having my intelligence insulted by saying that installing the corrupt incompetents in the Iraqi National Congress is going to lead to a flowering of democracy throughout the Middle East.

Again, who exactly is saying that?

From the public remarks I've heard from the Bush Administration, nobody is painting a simplified, rosy picture. I haven't heard a lot of confidence expressed in the INC, thus the plans to establish U.S. military governance intitially, ala MacArthur's governance of Japan.

Dave, I don't know that I'd want to base my argument on the list presented at that site; arguably only the intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, the intervention in Grenada in 1983, the invasion of Panama in 1989, and the Occupation of Haiti in 1994 were 'unilateral actions which led to regime change'.

The list, however, is incomplete: here is a more comprehensive list devoted exclusively to interventions in Latin America. Without more details of the interventions that occured during elections, it is hard to say whether or not they led to regime change; but the continued instability of the countries involved suggests that the presence of US troops did little to encourage the stability of the systems in those countries.

Scott, I think your sense of unfairness over the inclusion of actions which were not intended to change the regime is misguided. The point of the anti-war types who make this kind of argument is that "there is no reason to believe a regime change would be successful in creating democracy", with various historic regime changes that failed to create democracy touted to support the point. The response I've seen made most often in public debate is, basically "the failure of [regime changes x-z] does not mean there is a reason to believe this intervention would be a failure, because none of those had establishment of a democracy as a goal." Fair enough; these statements are not inconsistent. There is no evidence, outside of Germany and Japan, which suggests that such an intervention might be successful; if it is true that none of these other examples intended to establish democracy, it is also true that there is no evidence which suggests that such an intervention might be a failure.

The Jury is Still Out, so to speak.

But recognizing that raises the question of burden of proof. It is my contention that the burden of proof should lie with the people wishing to engage in interventionist policies; absent any evidence that what they are proposing will work, I remain skeptical, and that skepticism informs my opposition.

From President Bush's speech on the future of Iraq at the American Enterprise Institute, 2/26/03:

"Success in Iraq could also begin a new stage for Middle Eastern peace, and set in motion progress towards a truly democratic Palestinian state."

Complete text at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030226-11.html

Now true, it doesn't use the exact phrase, "flowering of democracy," but this made headline news on Feb 27th on every major (and most minor) newspaper in the US, and not long after that the phrase made it into circulation.

Thanks, Jon. Paul Wolfowitz has also made similar remarks on several occasions; Google wolfowitz democracy middle east and you’ll get a number of links.

Derek, if they’ve changed their minds about letting the INC’s would-be government-in-exile take charge, all the better.

But the record of US military governance is not as rosy as contemporary German and Japanese politics might lead you to belive. During the actual occupations (I know this is true for Japan; Rob, correct me if it's not true for Germany) a good number of war criminals were forgiven their crimes and put into government on the theory that their crimes weren’t as important as containing communism. Substitute “Islamic fundamentalism” or “Kurdish nationalism” for “communism” and you’ll get an idea of what I’m afraid of.

Oh, technically speaking, by the way, the invasion of Granada can be claimed not to be unilateral — I believe we bribed Jamaica and the Dominican Republic into going along the way we’ve been trying to bribe Turkey, and it was officially under the aegis of the OAS.

(What I didn’t realize is that we’d installed — reinstalled? — a British Governor-General in Granada; where was Maggie Thatcher in all of that?)

Well, basically I think it's perfectly legitimate to be skeptical about the Bush Administration's ability to create a stable democracy in Iraq.

But I hardly see it as any sort of argument against overthrowing Saddam, since his regime is so disgusting it is difficult to imagine a worse government arising out of American efforts.

Also, I don't see a shoddy track record as any kind of argument why it democracy shouldn't be attempted in Iraq. Especially if your other options are the following:

1) Leave Saddam in power
2) Plop in another strongman to take his place

Hell, even the fractious and inept INC would be better for Iraq than Saddam or another despot, don't you think?

I’ve never said I don’t think Hussein should be overthrown.

What I am saying is that I don’t think overthrowing him is important enough to be worth antagonizing Europe, undermining the UN, destabilizing the Middle East, dropping the ball in Afghanistan (ask the German and Danish peacekeepers who they think is pulling their weight over there), and letting Kim Jong Il get the Bomb. For starters.

Now, if it would do everything for the Middle East the Administration claims it will, then maybe it would be worth all that. But I don’t think it’s going to.

Well, to me the goal seems worthwhile, despite the pitfalls and risks, and even if we might possibly muck it up.

I'm more concerned about a nuclearized Iraq than an antagonized Europe, or an undermined U.N.

Exactly how stable is the Middle East anyway? Afghanistan, from what I've read, is wobbly, but on track, and we've lived up to our promises of aid and military support so far, unlike some other countries. And by most accounts, Kim Jong-Il probably already has the bomb.

These are all arguments new to the threat, though. Ivins' basic insinuation was that because we have a supposedly spotty record instilling democracy that we shouldn't even try in Iraq.

The reason that "an antagonized Europe, or an undermined U.N." are more important (IMVHO) than a potentially nuclearized Iraq is that civilization is dependent upon mutual faith and trust.

By actively working against this atmosphere of respect and cooperation, we are setting ourselves up for a future dedicated to constantly fighting to defend ourselves against those who would have worked with us toward common goals.

Antagonism vs cooperation: seems a dreadful long-term waste of energy and resources to me.

David: "She doesn't say there were fifteen failed attempts to produce democracy. She says there were twenty forced regime changes, and only five of them produced democracy."

But she clearly implies they were attempts at democracy. At least the way I read it (and I read it twice). But I've already said I thought it was a poorly written column. (I'm a structure snob.)

Aphrael: "there is no reason to believe a regime change would be successful in creating democracy"

Agreed, but that doesn't mean it could work either. I said she over-simplified, because every situation is different. I certainly think there's a good chance for democracy to take root in Iraq. The Iraqis are well educated and, from what I understand, actually would like to be in a democracy. The same is true for Iran (but they don't need our help). Iraq will certainly be easier than Afghanistan. Unfortunately, I don't think there's any chance at this time for Saudi Arabia.

My only remark about Ivins oversimplifying things is that about every single opinion columnist out there does it.

(sorry, just had to get that off my chest.)

Jon, of course they do. And not just opinion columnists, but talk show hosts on both radio and television. (Although the radio format at least allows for callers to expand the scope if allowed.) That's why I don't read or watch them. When I do read them (via links like David's), they generally aren't talking about the same things (or at least the same aspects) that I find myself talking about with others.

Derek — I’d be concerned about a nuclearized Iraq, too. If anyone has any evidence that they’re anywhere close to that, though, I haven’t seen it yet, and apparently no one else has, either.

Scott — I don’t think Molly implied any such thing, because she and most of her readers know enough about the history of US overseas interventions to know the idea’s ludicrous.

Well, that's simply not true.

http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/nuke/Post.htm

"The International Institute of Strategic Studies concluded that Iraq could assemble a nuclear weapon within months of acquiring fissile material abroad."

What is not in dispute is the fact that Saddam has been trying for 27 years to acquire nuclear weaponry. If not for the Israeli bombing of the Osiraq nuclear reactor, and if not for the first Gulf War, Iraq, by all estimates, would already have nuclear weapons.

If you are going to err on one side or the other, why give Saddam the benefit of the doubt and simply assume the best?

Scott, the best answer to that question is: 'if we're going to err on one side or the other, why err on the side of war'? While war is certainly a legitimate foreign policy option, it should always be a last resort.

But they did bomb the Osiraq reactor, and we did have the first Gulf War. Show me an Iraqi A-bomb factory or even a uranium enrichment plant, and I’ll happily see it blown to smithereens.

But most of the industrialized world could build a bomb if they aquired bomb-grade fissile material. Maybe we should take the $50-$150 billion the war’s going to cost and spend it on Russian nuclear security instead. Or on stopping North Korea from developing a plutonium export industry.

The FAS document you linked to says that we really have no evidence that Iraq has succeeded in doing that. The CIA concerns it cites come down to aluminum tubes and missing documents, and the aluminum tubes have been debunked. The failure to provide documents is real, but it doesn’t frighten me enough to make me think it’s worth a war that most of the world doesn’t want.

Aphrael: Again, I agree. We'll have to agree to disagree that the situation has reached the last resort.